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SPECIAL SECTION COLLOQUIUM
Anthropology as irony and 
philosophy, or the knots in 
simple ethnographic projects
Michael Carrithers, Durham University
In this essay on the idea of “anthropological knots” I lay out three closely related ideas. One 
is that the practice of ethnography may be regarded as being also the practice of philosophy, 
insofar as philosophy is the pursuit of knowledge about ourselves. The second is that this 
pursuit of ethnography/philosophy is in its nature ironical, which means roughly that it is 
woven, or knotted, in the encounter of differing viewpoints, just as Socrates’ philosophical 
work was created in ironizing conversation between different persons and their different 
viewpoints. The third is that our philosophical, ironical ethnography is a performance to be 
celebrated; and, again, it is a performance that is woven, knotted together.
Keywords: anthropological theory, irony, philosophy, ethnography
In what follows, I explore ethnography as philosophy and ethnography as irony, 
quite explicitly, as a connected argument. I demonstrate the nature of ethnography 
as performance, however, in a different way, by letting its staged and rhetorically 
targeted character show through. That is, I present the argument (after this preface, 
that is) as a talk complete with slides.
It is true, in fact, that this essay did begin life as a talk with slides, and indeed 
it has long been my practice to prepare any “paper” that I give as a sequence of 
slides on which I improvise rather than a written text; and those slides have a par-
ticular character, namely that they are each an illustration, or piece of evidence, 
upon which the (as yet unwritten but spoken and heard) argument will depend 
for its purchase in the world of experience. This is a practice that has grown on me 
ever since I came to believe that an ethnographic argument can be best ordered by 
first setting out the examples/illustrations/evidence, those things that actually hap-
pened in the field to open my mental eyes, in an order that would allow a listener 
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or reader to move with growing insight from one vivid occurrence or statement to 
the next. Then the work of writing or speaking is to knot together the explanatory 
threads that draw those details into a whole, which can be followed, as the eye can 
follow a complex knot, such as that of Figure 1.
Figure 1: Garrick or carrick bend (from A. Hyatt Verrill, Knots, splices, and rope work, 
n.d., http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13510/13510-h/13510-h.htm)
I should stress, though, that this actual essay shares only some of the slides—and 
some of the argument—that appeared in that original talk. This is very much writ-
ing, not talking, though throughout I have tried to preserve and enhance the dia-
logical, interactive character that was so plainly and inescapably present in that 
original performance, but which might be lost or ploughed under in the apparently 
monological genre of an academic paper.
It is also important to recall what a knot of practices, people, relations, ma-
chines, and their technologies have met to bring these words to you, the reader. 
Remarkable are not just the computers and wired circuits with their algorithms, but 
even more so, the people who work together to support this highly mediated activ-
ity of publishing. And to crown the wonder, there is what you bring to this already 
elaborate tangle. You bring the practice of reading, a practice that you apply skill-
fully, contributing a set of experiences and abilities acquired in that further knot of 
practices, institutions, and technologies that we call “education.”
So what you are reading is inescapably a knotted performance, indeed a cultural 
performance, as we anthropological scientists might call it. Just as Malinowski laid 
down the huge hinterland to the stylized performance of handing over a necklace 
or armband in the kula ring, so we might reveal the weavings that comprise our 
own mediated performances.
I make these prefatory remarks not just to heighten our awareness of the mi-
raculously interwoven character of our apparently straightforward academic do-
ings but to make another point as well, a point encapsulated in that phrase, cultural 
performance. For the phrase can be used not just for the preliminary incantations 
and subsequent speechifying of a distant kula performance but also for our own 
activities. But when we use the phrase about ourselves—for example, in describ-
ing the ornate procedures of the British university exam system—it opens quite 
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another can of writhing knots. It becomes ironic, which is to say two things im-
mediately: first, that you, the speaker, are standing aside to view the phenomenon, 
so now there is multiplication of interwoven viewpoints, at the very least your own 
and that of someone uncomplicatedly involved in the system (for more on this see 
Carrithers 2013 on “seriousness and irony”). And second, by the implicit compari-
son with other cultural performances, this performance is suddenly revealed to be 
contingent rather than necessary, and therefore a matter open to many possibilities, 
interpretations, and viewpoints.
And now on to the talk itself.
The next slide
When I started thinking about the topic of anthropological knots, I happened to 
be reading Alexander Nehamas’ splendid book, The art of living: Socratic reflections 
from Plato to Foucault (1998). I found that Nehamas’ Socrates, among all the many 
versions of Socrates you might encounter, fitted both with the direction of my own 
thinking and with the image of knots. I encapsulated this happy harmony in figure 
2, the next slide.
Figure 2: Socrates’ anthropology
Though we only have him through writing, we can nevertheless take it that Socrates’ 
form of thinking was best, and probably only, expressed through spoken dialogue. 
And dialogue, in a more general sense, is an umbrella concept for all human 
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expression, which after all is always addressed, always has a real or notional recipi-
ent and a possible response, whether laid down by granite carving or broadcast in 
a shout in the street at night. Anthropologists may fairly consider themselves to 
be notably dialogic, too, since they engage in that original dialogue, namely verbal 
conversation, with some parties, and in written dialogue with others, the address-
ees of ethnographic works.
Socrates was notable, said Cicero (I’m taking you clockwise around the slide) 
for turning investigative thought, through dialogue, from contemplating the heav-
ens and what we call the “natural” world to contemplating ourselves. At present this 
self-contemplation has split into a huge variety of disciplines and ever ramifying 
subdisciplines, from those of psychology and sociology through to various versions 
of contemporary professionalized philosophy. Following Nehamas’ and Socrates’ 
inclination, though, I’m going to stick with the idea of philosophy as an enterprise 
revealing one’s own assumptions, and so making for an examined, rather than an 
unexamined, form of life—and, for that matter, having a therapeutic purpose, clari-
fying sites of ignorance and error, and not just stating supposedly positive, a priori 
truths. In this sense even the most modest ethnographic report, by displaying an 
alternative to our own practices and assumptions, opens for us the possibility of 
reflecting on ourselves and on what we unthinkingly think human nature to be.
Or to put this another way (I take you another step around the slide), ethnog-
raphy-read-as-philosophy reveals that on any one site—and by “site” I mean any 
trait that varies surprisingly across human societies, such as, say, personhood, the 
nature and existence of divinities, or the etiology of disease—there exists a multi-
plicity of prescriptions and understandings. (So here we are back with irony.)
But then—and this is the slide’s final entry—this multiplicity amounts to an apo-
ria, an ancient Greek word to mean an impasse, a radical uncertainty, or a contra-
diction. It is true that, as anthropologists, we commonly practice cultural relativism, 
such that we gaze dispassionately on the multiplicity of prescriptions and practices 
that may pile up on any site (personhood, divinities, etc.) and suspend judgment. 
But that suspension of judgment can never deliver the final word, since the mem-
brane between us as professing anthropologists and as thinking and morally entan-
gled human beings is always porous. Were it not, then Louis Dumont could not have 
written so generally and philosophically of hierarchy and egalitarianism, or Marilyn 
Strathern of gender. This is not to say that either of them provided a final answer 
on those topics, but rather that they laid bare each aporia and showed us another 
inexhaustible site of further fruitful puzzlement for self-and-other-knowledge.
The next four slides
The aporia I address here is a close cousin to those, but derives less from a self-
and-other dialectic than from the character of our anthropological enterprise itself. 
Consider, on the one hand, the next slide:
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Figure 3: Our raw material: The complexity of human social life (photo © M. Carrithers)
An even better representation of the complexity of human social life would be, say, 
a time-lapse video of this tangle, since it would suggest as well the constant motility 
of our human soap opera. But in any case this is where anthropology begins, in a 
confrontation with some scene of constantly ramifying, developing, and differenti-
ating understandings, encounters, and consequences.
From such a scene, then, we labor, through ethnography and further lucubra-
tions, often called “theory,” to create an ordered and intelligible account, as we see 
in figure 4.
Figure 4: Anthropology’s product: An ordered account (photo © M. Carrithers)
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This is a page from Godfrey Lienhardt’s Divinity and experience: The religion of 
the Dinka (1961), which I will call as a witness for excellence later. But for now I 
want just to note the skeleton of order he found, or fashioned, among the tangled 
complexity he met: the book evidently has a “Part One,” which in turn is divided 
into sections, here section I, “Division in the World,” and that section in turn 
is subdivided, starting here with subsection “i.” Such explicit organization is not 
necessary, but some such organization, explicit or implicit, must be integral to 
such a work, or else it would not count as a monograph and would not have been 
published. And that organization necessarily appears, too, in the finer grain of the 
prose, being syntactically complex and maximally explicit—or at least as explicit 
as possible while still having a readable and portable book—in order to address a 
not entirely specified but in any case educated readership: a cultural performance 
indeed.
On to the next slide.
Figure 5: Knowledge for the market (photo © M. Carrithers)
I mean figure 5 to exemplify the further fate of our ordered knowledge, namely that 
it is then packaged as a portable commodity and sent out into a market, that is, into 
a company of strangers. It is true, I think, that when this monograph was first pub-
lished, Lienhardt would have known personally many of those in the then intimate 
world of British social anthropology who purchased or read the book (or both). But 
through the medium of the market, and then through the medium of those other 
publicizing institutions, the library and the university, it would also have reached, 
and now continues to reach, a readership far beyond those whom Lienhardt could 
have known face-to-face. And, as I have stressed, it was designed for that world of 
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(educated) strangers, with as much hope of success as Lienhardt and the editors of 
Oxford University Press could manage.
What I am trying to convey is not yet the aporia I have in mind, but is rather the 
rough and uneven ground on which that aporia arises. On one hand, Lienhardt, 
like all ethnographers, faced a situation in the field whose difficulty comprised not 
only that of achieving a basic comprehension of fluid events and persons, but also 
of extending that elementary comprehension to grasp some of the order that the 
others, the Dinka themselves, sought to impose on situations. And he had then to 
find a further territory of intelligibility, hard won by thought and the discoveries of 
writing, to set before a company of strangers, his readership.
The final challenge of Lienhardt’s situation, then, lay with the readers them-
selves, as suggested in figure 6:
Figure 6: Publication as engagement of the imagination
Lienhardt had labored, that is, in such a way that the readership of strangers would 
scan the lines and squiggles laid down by Oxford University Press and visualize an or-
der in that original thicket of events and people that he encountered during fieldwork.
In so describing the labor of ethnography I mean to suggest how great an ac-
complishment it is. If we accept that visualizing or imagining is a great, or the 
greatest, part of understanding, then Lienhardt’s ability to understand and then to 
open that distant world to our reading imaginations is a memorable achievement.
But if we also for a moment think of how relatively complex and vulnerable to alter-
native interpretations just one part of that whole arc of imagining-and-understanding 
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is, namely that part between the page itself and the interpreting reader, then we can 
also capture some of the vulnerability and fragility across the ethnographic process as 
a whole. Paul Friedrich put this pervasive vulnerability more generally with chilling 
clarity, writing that “all . . . instances [of speaking or writing], given the dialogic situ-
ation of all communication, involve some slippage or lack of fit between the intended 
meaning and what was understood, between what was anticipated and what actually 
happened” (2001: 238). Those of us involved in universities as teachers and writers 
will have experienced often enough how one’s intended meaning can go astray.
The aporia at last
Nevertheless, we go on operating this academic world and our discipline of anthro-
pology with considerable confidence, based on an assumed common culture and 
set of skills and practices. Michael Warner put his finger directly on our Western 
academic culture’s central feature:
Figure 7: Our language ideology (Warner 2002)
The first trait of our anthropological/academic language ideology, that it is “propo-
sitionally summarizable,” is exemplified well enough in the widespread practice of 
the written examination in the North Atlantic and Anglophone worlds. Speaking 
from my experience of British university examining, I can say with some confi-
dence that we would be surprised, and suspicious, if our words were reproduced 
exactly in an examination; and our suspicion would turn to dark certainty if they 
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were reproduced exactly and without quotation marks in an essay/paper, for that 
would be plagiarism. So it is not just that we assume that our arguments can be 
summarized in different words but we also school students in the cultural perfor-
mance of such summarizing-without-verbatim-reproduction.
The corollary, then, is that the “poetic or textual qualities” of our products are 
largely irrelevant. So long as we can make ourselves more or less understood and 
our prose is recognizable as academic, we are home free. And this freedom within 
broad limits is encouraged by the accompanying assumption that our readers (or 
listeners) are going to understand our discourse just as we mean it, with no de-
viation. We can send these, our brainchildren, out into the world among all those 
strangers (“confidence in the stranger-sociability of public circulation”) knowing 
that they will be well and properly received.
Now we have arrived at the threshold of my chosen aporia: on one hand, an-
thropologists communicate on the basis that what they write will be understood 
as planned. On the other—if we take Paul Friedrich’s dictum to heart—“all com-
munication involve[s] some . . . lack of fit between the intended meaning and what 
was understood.” So our work is predicated throughout on a basis of its immediate 
transparency, yet it meets with unintended reinterpretation at every turn.
This is not, I think, the bad news it may appear to be. But let me for the moment 
sharpen even further the two horns of the contradiction. On to the next slide:
Figure 8: Anthropology as archive of accurate and communicable facts
Insofar as anthropology can be regarded as knowledge, it communicates facts, and 
from these facts our discipline as a whole can be thought of as creating an archive of 
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the variations of human organization and experience across the world and through 
time. The most concrete expression of such archive-like knowledge is probably the 
Human Relations Area Files (HRAF). But even if one does not accept the HRAF as 
the best model for anthropologists’ achievements, still it is in part the accumulation 
of such information that establishes anthropologists’ claim to exist among other 
disciplines. To that extent our knowledge is unambiguous. We know that there ex-
ists cross-cousin marriage in South India and Sri Lanka, and that it cannot be con-
fused with other forms of marriage, such as those characteristic of North India. If, 
in our cultural performance of an “examination,” I asked for the form of marriage 
among the Sinhalese of Sri Lanka, and you wrote “parallel cousin,” your answer 
would be inaccurate. And if one were to object, as many have, that “marriage”—like 
other similar comparative terms—is itself questionable, then that objection itself 
would have to be founded in part on further information, further facts.
So to that extent, at least, we can speak of anthropology as a positive discipline, 
positing information and knowledge. And it is on the basis of that archival knowl-
edge that we may challenge other disciplines—I think especially of evolutionary 
psychology here—and force on them the necessity to consider the sheer variety of 
human behaviors, a variety that we can demonstrate factually.
Now on to the next slide:
Figure 9: The aporia in full
But it is possible to tell a very different story, for the notion/practice of facts, and 
of their accuracy, holds sway only insecurely in our anthropological imperium. 
Otherwise we practice interpretation or translation, and therefore are inevitably 
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concerned with faithfulness rather than accuracy. Whereas accuracy is in principle 
a matter of a true or false judgment, faithfulness is a matter of a more-or-less, of the 
relative fidelity of a translation to the original, of the translation’s ability to evoke 
the original. Literary translators refer to the Italian saying, “traduttore traditore,” 
meaning “a translator is a traitor,” or better, “to translate is to betray” (thanks to 
Paolo Fortis for reminding me of this). On a romanticized view, a wholly satisfacto-
ry evocation of the original is never possible; but even on a more workmanlike view 
we still have a mighty challenge in rendering one world intelligible in another while 
retaining some allegiance to the first. We need to bear in mind the original prac-
tices, language, rationalities, and viewpoints alongside the provisional character of 
our own understanding in the field; and to that are added the possible renderings 
available to us in our target language and (so far as possible) the possible misinter-
pretations among our stranger readership. So our work of ethnography is quintes-
sentially ironic just insofar as any of our ethnographic expressions is accompanied 
from beginning to end by that cloud of other possibilities and interpretations.
There you have the aporia: anthropology is necessarily positive but it is also 
inescapably ironic; it is necessarily unambiguous but is inevitably ambiguous.
What irony means
Now I sense among some of you, my stranger readership, discomfort about the 
argument so far, and I promise to illustrate concretely what I mean. But I also sense 
unease at my use of the term “irony,” so let me first be more explicit about its mean-
ing in this next slide:
Figure 10: Irony defined
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On the next page, Kenneth Burke writes of “sub-certainties” rather than “sub-per-
spectives,” and I think that is more useful, so I am going to stick with that. He writes 
that the “resultant [ironic] certainty,” the “certainty” of the observer who considers 
all the sub-certainties at once, is “of a different quality, necessarily ironic, since 
it requires that all the sub-certainties be considered as neither true nor false, but 
contributory” ([1969] 1945: 513). To translate this for anthropology: all the sub-
certainties among those studied, and of the ethnographer’s representation, and of 
the readers’ interpretations, are at play at once. It also follows that the resultant 
“certainty” of the anthropologist is also more a subcertainty, however assertively 
and positively he or she writes. For to call the anthropologist an ironic observer 
in this sense is not to bestow a god-like certitude on her but only to say that she 
stands in a particular position, which may be “above” or “beside” other positions, 
but in any case separated from them. And indeed a similarly ironic observerhood 
appears wherever we meet someone setting out a variety of characters or positions 
and their vicissitudes vis-à-vis one another, as happens in a wide variety of human 
performances, among them drama, diplomacy, philosophizing, political delibera-
tion, historical narrative, and of course humor, whether across the kitchen table or 
broadcast to the world. So if anthropologists’ performance of irony has its particu-
lar flavor, it is nevertheless only one species of irony among many.
In figure 10, I follow irony in another direction as well. Burke’s definition treats 
it solely as an effect of someone’s artful intention (“when one tries . . . to produce 
a development”), whereas English speakers often cast the net to encompass unin-
tended situations “when events conspire” to produce a development of contrasting 
expectations, possibilities, and subcertainties. I recently found myself reading an 
account of a football club manager whose current winning streak would do noth-
ing to keep him from losing his job. The situation was designated “ironic” by the 
sportswriter, who thereby pointed up the contrasts between subcertainties—he was 
hired as a good manager, was later judged a poor manager, and now seems a good 
manager again. These are ironies that emerge from the fecund ground of passing 
time, which we sometimes call “history.” On a larger scale, the “war on terror,” 
as it was designated by George W. Bush, has led to a monumental proliferation 
of ironies, including the creation of yet more “terrorists” by the terrifying acts to 
suppress them. James Fernandez had his eye on such occasions, however great or 
small, when he observed, “irony can be expected in situations of unequal power 
when discourses, interests, or cultures clash” (2004: 4).
Inadvertent ironies
So we can think of inadvertent ironies as that rich conflicted material thrown up by 
the inexorable juggernaut of events, and performed ironies as someone’s bringing 
that material to awareness through an artful performance. I first use the idea of 
inadvertent ironies to explore the ironic fate among readers of a positively intended 
and nonironically assertive ethnography. And I then turn to the performed irony 
that characterizes Lienhardt’s exemplary ethnography.
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I place in evidence The forest monks of Sri Lanka: An anthropological and his-
torical study (Carrithers 1983), which turns out to have a quite illuminating history 
of reading. Here is something of the author’s original positive assertion about the 
book. It was to be, he announced on page four, an “anthropological and historical 
study” of “thought in action, of the monks’ various attempts to act by their precepts, 
to embody their ideals” [the original author’s italics]. One might think that there is 
only one set of Buddhist ideals and so only one set of practices and institutions, but 
by pages seven and eight we learn that there was nevertheless considerable varia-
tion among the few hundred forest monks in the island. This derived in part from 
differences of circumstance, but also from the fact that “the ideal was itself com-
plex, composed of different and to an extent contradictory models which had been 
laid one on top of the other in the course of Buddhism’s history.” So the book as a 
whole was dedicated to laying out the spectrum of different forest monks alongside 
their respective understandings of their heritage. The author meant the book to be 
positive discourse, dedicated to getting it right, to being as unambiguous as possi-
ble. There was an overarching purpose as well, namely that the book should not be 
addressed to scholars alone but should open to a wider Anglophone readership, in 
the conviction that readers’ awareness would be enriched by contemplating these 
further versions of human possibility—which was his version of what anthropol-
ogy should do.
Now for the most part the author was confirmed in his positivity and his 
certainty. The reviews of the book by the cognoscenti suggested that it was read 
sympathetically, and the author was then satisfied that his point had come across 
(and he managed to ignore those small differences of viewpoint or understand-
ing that, from the present viewpoint, offered a certainty departing from his own). 
Even the howler pointed out in a review by a much-amused Sinhalese anthro-
pologist in the United States confirmed that even where wrong, he could have 
got it positively right.
But the book lived a life of its own and other readers did what they wanted with 
it as time passed. In late 2013 I began looking into the book’s fate with the suspicion 
that there might be something interesting there, under the heading of “anthropo-
logical knots,” after all these years.
The first, minor irony that appeared was this: the author had been pleased to 
publish it with Oxford University Press in Delhi, for that meant that, though still 
pricey by their lights, some Sri Lankans could nevertheless buy it.
However, with the passage of time . . . well, see the next slide.
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Figure 11: Can that figure be right? (Amazon UK, accessed January 5, 2014)
So that’s what time and the iron hand of the market can do to one’s intentions.
Retrospective inadvertent ironies
There were ironies, though, that touched more closely on the substance and import 
of Forest monks.
Figure 12: Uncomfortable ironies
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At the time this was published the author of Forest monks had gone on to other 
projects, but he still cherished the certainty that the book was straightforwardly 
positive, factual, and accurate, the work of an intellectually engaged but dispassion-
ate observer—“just the facts, ma’am,” to quote the FBI agent of Dragnet. So the view 
that there was a “personal quest” involved and that the author had made his own 
judgment about the ascetic ideal caused unease, an unease that remains through 
writing this essay. For there is a truth in Spencer’s review, a subcertainty that turned 
Michael Carrithers’ positive certainty into another subcertainty straightaway.
This discomfort was modified by a yet further subcertainty, one that Carrithers 
met among some in the world of British social anthropology in which he found 
himself, namely that one’s task and privilege as anthropologist is to act as the final 
judge of what is really going on, what underlies the deceptive surfaces of social ap-
pearance. From that point of view, the privilege that Carrithers gave to the monks’ 
self-assessment compromised his critical sociological apperception.
So far as I can now see, no one of these subcertainties triumphs, so Carrithers’ 
positive and factual account must coexist ironically as one subcertainty among oth-
ers. And as I write another subcertainty suggests itself, namely that the book’s per-
spective, its “own understanding of the ascetic ideal,” is deeply colored by contact 
with the monk of the last chapter, The Venerable Tambugala Anandasiri. Ananda-
siri himself stood slightly aside, to some degree like the anthropologist. He, too, 
had traveled with a notebook among forest and meditating monks, interviewing 
them and coming to know the variety of styles then existing, so that his own her-
mitage represented a thoroughly informed and highly reflective view of what a 
hermitage might be.
Carrithers might have consoled himself that, like Victor Turner’s work, colored 
by Muchona the Hornet, his work’s subcertainty is modified by that of Anandasiri 
(see Turner 1960). Yet that defense raises a further subcertainty: does not some de-
pendence on a single local interpreter prejudice the anthropologist’s ability to write 
“accurately” of a whole extended social scene? Subcertainties proliferate.
Ironies from a public of strangers
But anthropologists were not the only readers of Forest monks.
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Figure 13: A manual for spiritual seekers
The author thought that his aim, to report on a version of human possibility, lay 
wholly within the bounds of ethnography and so of scholarship alone. But still this 
came as a pleasant surprise, as a reading that could find in those factually intended 
lines and squiggles on the page something of the significance that forest monks 
themselves found.
But there were other, even more surprising, readers as well.
Figure 14: The president speaks (My italics. Brought to my attention by Kemper 1990.)
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Carrithers had in fact received a letter from the office of the then President of Sri 
Lanka, offering to translate Forest monks into Sinhala. He was suspicious of this of-
fer, so he prevaricated, and the translation was never made.
On the one hand, the forest monks did regard themselves as following “the real 
Buddhist way of life,” and that was largely understood among them as a contrast to 
the routinized practices of the majority Buddhist clergy spread throughout Bud-
dhist Sri Lanka. The “political monks,” on the other hand, were making quite a dif-
ferent critique of the clergy. They held that monks should regard their role as active 
“social service.” This concept prescribed a benevolent engagement in social welfare 
and political action on behalf of the poor, ignorant, and downtrodden among the 
people (for more on this see the magisterial work of H. L. Seneviratne 1999). More-
over the “political” monks could find, in the voluminous record of Buddhist his-
tory, helpful rhetorical resources to guide and justify their projects, just as the forest 
monks did. Yet this socially and politically active interpretation of the monk’s role 
was hardly welcomed by Jayewardene and others among the conservative ruling 
elite, who turned Forest monks from an ethnographic report into a rebuttal within 
an ongoing political dispute.
So it turned out that the hopeful act of publishing Forest monks for a readership 
of the seriously curious entailed its use by unexpected others as well—for that is the 
nature of a public and of publication, that books go to strangers.
Once taken up in that spirit, though, the book was available to even more sur-
prising readings. Next slide please.
Figure 15: A later generation speaks
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An English forest monk in Sri Lanka wrote once in his journal that he did not 
want to be a brick put in upside down in someone else’s wall. The Carrithers who 
wrote Forest monks would have torn out handfuls of his not yet thinning hair at this 
reading of his work. He would have said that “reform” was the best English equiva-
lent he could find for some of the forest monks’ self-representation, that if it was 
“supposed” it was not supposed by him but by them, and that there was nothing 
about “secularism” or “progress” stated or implied in Forest monks. And he would 
also have said that, if there was any colonizing at all to be done by his work, it was 
the colonizing of the West through understanding aspirations and achievements in 
the East.
Yet Ananda Abeysekara’s reading, too, arose in the unyielding march of events 
and so of inadvertent irony. When Carrithers began to write in the early 1970s, his 
notion of appropriate style was colored by reading a wide variety of ethnographies 
that were written carefully to be read from beginning to end by an educated An-
glophone public. He was encouraged in this, too, by a similar, if fast disappearing, 
style of ethnographic writing, which he happened to meet, and admire, in the per-
son and work of Godfrey Lienhardt in Oxford, and in the writings of Lienhardt’s 
supervisor, E. E. Evans-Pritchard. In this style one wrote to a broad readership of 
generalists, and the apparatus of critical reference to other anthropologists’ argu-
ments was absent, or rather, buried and implicit beneath the single-minded effort 
to lay out the sense and reasoning of the people discussed.
Abeysekara’s is a later and different world. He wrote, I suppose, in the 1990s, to 
a now highly professionalized, specialized, and inward-gazing academic readership 
that has increasingly expected that any ethnographic detail (such as that offered so 
well by Abeysekara elsewhere in his book) will be thickly framed by explicit gener-
alizing argument and a recognizable abstracting academic vocabulary—by theory, 
in other words. Increasingly it is this dense theorizing, rather than the ethnography, 
which is thought to create the value of the work. (In the United Kingdom it is even 
possible now to encounter doctoral theses in which the author has intentionally 
effaced most of the ethnography in the interest of theoretical elaboration.) These 
days publishers regard theoretical writing as necessary to make a work publishable, 
for such writing thereby addresses a wider potential readership—not just those re-
searching Sri Lanka, say, but anyone researching a similar issue—even though that 
supposedly wider readership is cabined and confined within the narrow academic 
guild alone.
Perhaps this pervasive theorizing is nothing more than the historical working 
out of anthropology’s philosophical promise. Yet for the most part such thick theo-
rizing derives its philosophical challenge, less from the unaccountably surprising 
lives of the people studied, and more from playing on the work of other theorists. 
The consequence is that a book such as Forest monks can now be read, not for the 
challenge it may raise through the works and imaginings of its subjects but rather 
for whatever theoretical position it may be thought to espouse, and probably es-
pouse wrongly.
“Irony,” wrote Fernandez, “can be expected in situations of unequal power when 
discourses, interests, or cultures clash” (2004: 4). Western Buddhists read Forest 
monks through their discourse, that of Buddhist practitioners; Jayewardene read 
it through his interests, his political position; and Abeysekara read it through his 
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culture, or subculture, in academe. All these inadvertent ironies could become fer-
tile ground for performed irony . . . and I see with some surprise that I have obliged 
in some measure, by splitting my possibly unitary person into two, namely Carrith-
ers the ethnographer on one hand, and myself, the current commentator, on the 
other, each with his own subcertainty among all the others.
Performed irony
So whether she wishes it or not, the ethnographer, sitting at her desk ready to write, 
will find herself poised between the discourses, interests, and cultures of her field-
work on one hand, and the discourses, interests, and cultures of her readership 
on the other. Even worse, our ethnographic craft worker confronts not only that 
clamor of absent-but-all-too-present voices but also an aporia, a contradiction, 
demanding an account accurate, unambiguous, and factual, but at the same time 
evocative, interpretative, and multivocal. A knot indeed.
But not a lethal knot. My message may seem pessimistic and destructive, but I 
mean to be celebratory. The aporia, however thorny, is also fertile and stimulating. 
And so I come to Godfrey Lienhardt’s Divinity and experience, which I regard as a 
model of ethnographic exposition, but at the same time of anthropological philoso-
phizing, this latter not because it wears its theory outwardly but lets the material 
itself present the challenge to Our (and perhaps Their) self-knowledge. Here is the 
beginning of Lienhardt’s performance:
Figure 16: Performed irony
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This passage evinces, at first glance, a tone of factual exposition. Sample ques-
tion: do Dinka cultivate ideas of a separate spirit world? Answer: no. Such exposi-
tion carries on throughout the book, so we are justified—if only to that extent at 
least—in placing this work confidently into the archive of positive anthropological 
knowledge.
A closer inspection, though, shows far more going on. Consider that first sen-
tence. It begins, “Within the single world known to them . . .” and already that oth-
erwise superfluous “single” signals that there exist other possibilities, of a doubled 
or perhaps multiple world for the Dinka; for why write “single” when you are just 
talking about “the world”? And we then find clarification in an aside, marked off 
as such in parentheses: “(for they dwell little upon fancies of any “other world” of 
different constitution) . . .”
This is far more than just simple factual exposition. Here Lienhardt makes use 
of punctuation and typography to offer a larger dialogic, ironic, performance of 
multiple voices and perspectives, some played out, others just suggested. In the 
first place, the parentheses effect dramatic irony, that device by which the speaking 
actor, sometimes by a stage-whispered address to the audience, marks off an appar-
ent certainty acted among those on stage from the superior and different certainty 
vouchsafed to the audience. Then, within that aside, Lienhardt ventriloquizes an 
(inferior) subcertainty, marked by the quotation marks around “other world.” We 
are not told, here or elsewhere, just who would be talking thus about some “other 
world.” For Lienhardt devotes his effort throughout to the knotty labor of finding 
the most felicitous way of characterizing the Dinka themselves, rather than adopt-
ing the established conceptual coinage of professional anthropology or engaging 
argumentatively with established professional opinions. He leaves us to infer his 
understanding of those other voices and how they might err. My own preference is 
to read him as rejecting the self-deceptive ease with which ethnographers and oth-
er, perhaps Christian, writers on religion before (and after) him may utilize terms 
such as “spirit” and “spirit world,” as though those words described something plain 
and single, however differently inflected across a huge variety of societies. And by 
portraying the Dinka as “dwell[ing] little upon fancies” of such an imagined world, 
Lienhardt shows the Dinka to be more sensible and practical than anyone talking 
so fluently and, yes, fancifully, of “spirits” and a “spirit-world.”
Instead, he develops a separate and distinctive vocabulary—the Dinka jok be-
comes “Powers,” and the unusual but immediately understandable “ultra-human” 
replaces the standard kneejerk “supernatural.” Later he will introduce the terms 
“Divinity” and “divinities,” which again establish a multiplicity of voices: his own, 
speaking as translator; that of the Dinka, speaking their own language; and that 
of conventional anthropological others, which would give “God” or “Spirit,” and 
“spirits.” And in fact this latter terminology—“Spirit,” spirits, and God—is con-
sciously chosen in a monograph about a people closely related to the Dinka, Evans-
Pritchard’s Nuer religion (1956), which was written with the close cooperation of 
Lienhardt, as Evans-Pritchard points out in the preface to his book. Though both 
write eloquently and persuasively in their respective books of the difficulty of find-
ing an appropriate English vocabulary for Nuer/Dinka concepts, Lienhardt has, I 
think, the last word. He wrote this:
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To use the word “God” in translating some Dinka statements . . . would 
raise metaphysical and semantic problems of our own for which there is 
no parallel among the Dinka and in their language. Perhaps the extent 
to which it would be permissible to translate [their term] by “God” is 
something of which theologians might judge at the end of an account of 
Dinka religion. (1961: 29)
You may find this summary statement tactful toward Evans-Pritchard, or not, but 
it does use an eloquent irony of indirection to convey a difference I once stumbled 
across between the “theological” and the “phenomenological” study of a religion 
such as Buddhism or Hinduism. Apparently such “theological” study would be 
from an explicitly Christian perspective and addressed to Christians, while “phe-
nomenological” study would be, well, just the sort of thing Lienhardt did and Car-
rithers tried to do.
In the next slide we see how Lienhardt’s vocabulary serves two purposes at once.
Figure 17: The ultra-human
The total effect of this compacted statement is multiple. Lienhardt concentrates our 
minds on the difficult philosophical task of comprehending the Dinka; he forces 
us to confront our own experience of the ultra-human, and the character of that 
understanding is sharpened by both the contrast, and the similarity, with the Dinka 
understanding; and he does all this by forcing us past our accustomed concep-
tual language to unaccustomed words, words that gain vividness and specificity by 
the contrast with that accustomed language. We may choose to rest finally in our 
own understanding of lightning’s ultra-human power—stormy winds drive air and 
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water molecules past each other in clouds to produce an overpowering difference 
of electrical potential, and zap!—but nevertheless we are, like the Dinka, still pow-
erlessly human as against that ultra-human.
Divinity and experience
When Burke offered his definition of irony he blithely paired irony with dialec-
tic as different aspects of the same, namely “voices, personalities, or perspectives 
integrally affecting one another.” We may tend to read “dialectic” in the light of, 
for example, a Kant or a Hegel, where a monolithic voice lays out a monolithic 
and systematic philosophy. In origin, though, “dialectic” is sibling of “dialogic,” and 
both echo something of a Socratic practice of working toward self-understanding, 
however inconclusively, through the encounter of different voices over the same 
knotty matter . . . which is where I started.
In this sense the central chapter of Lienhardt’s book, a chapter itself titled “Di-
vinity and Experience,” is an extended dialectic, hovering over a problem that he 
poses very carefully. The key is in those words of his introduction, “[the Powers] 
emerge in the interpretation of events.” This mild phrase foreshadows the core of 
Lienhardt’s dialectical/dialogical performance. For there are matters “of which a 
foreigner can also have direct knowledge.” These include 1) the Dinkas’ “particular 
physical and social environment,” 2) those events to which Dinka respond, such as 
illness, lightning, strife, and so forth, and 3) those “configurations of experience,” 
which include the Dinkas’ reaction to the events and the environment. So whereas 
the Dinka have not elaborated a cosmology and philosophy in the way that, for 
example, the Navajo have done (Farella 1984), Lienhardt is in a position to read the 
environment, the events, and the reactions to events in order to extract what might 
be called a dialectical phenomenology of Dinka experience (if you will pardon me 
for that monstrous phrase). And he points out that although “Powers may be as 
much part of the Dinkas’ total experience—as much phenomena—for them, as are 
the physical and social realities to which . . . we refer,” nevertheless Dinka are per-
fectly capable of discussing the realities of experience without reference to Powers 
(1961: 147).
I cannot here rehearse Lienhardt’s argument as a whole, but this sample may 
suffice:
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Figure 18: Passiones
Similarly, in the next moment in that philosophical conversation, Lienhardt shows 
us that, where we might feel guilt at owing someone money, as though that feeling 
arose within us through our act of remembering, Dinka would regard that feeling 
as the manifestation of an external Power, instigated by the creditor. It is in this 
regard that Lienhardt resurrects that obsolete Latinate term, “passiones,” to capture 
generally those things that happen to us, those things that seize us, rather than 
those things that we bring about as “agents.”
So here is one sort of philosophical self-knowledge we might encounter: we, as 
humans, might encounter our world without an interposed apparatus of “mind,” 
so that what we think of as thinking we might instead experience as being worked 
upon. That is—or so I reenact it for myself—another way of being human than I 
might be. And more to the point, I can also see that my “remembering” Sri Lanka 
might as well be Sri Lanka still seizing me, after all these years. Or, more darkly, if 
I had returned from war in Afghanistan, it could just as well be Afghanistan still 
working on me, and not just my mind playing painful tricks.
And here is another sort of self-knowledge that rises from Lienhardt’s conver-
sation with the Dinka: we understand ourselves through our (folk) psychology 
featuring a more or less complex anatomy of working parts “inside” us, and that 
“insideness” of our experience colors our understanding of much that impinges 
upon us, or seizes us, such that what we suffer (passiones) may be thought the fault 
of our own inner workings.
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In these respects, but in many others as well, Lienhardt’s is a deeply philosophi-
cal argument. But note, too, the aporia that runs through that argument. On the 
one hand, his account is based in matters “of which a foreigner can also have direct 
knowledge,” with the implication that they can be described univocally, factually, and 
accurately. Or to put it another way, these are as close as a seasoned, knowledgeable, 
and hard-working anthropological fieldworker can come to creating raw evidence 
for the archive. And as I have argued at length elsewhere, we are entirely justified in 
treating carefully crafted descriptions of even complex social interactions as eviden-
tial in nature: such descriptions play a role in our ethnographic practice analogous 
to the role of evidence in many natural scientific practices (Carrithers 1996).
On the other hand—or on the other sharp thorn of the aporia—these eviden-
tial accounts form the foundation for an evocative, interpretative, multivocal, and 
therefore ironic meditation on Dinka self-knowledge in contrast with our own.
So there you have it: our anthropological dilemma, our aporia, our embarrass-
ing contradiction. We have collectively agonized over this pickle for more than 
a generation, and we have manufactured from it a huge variety of answers or at 
least attitudes, none of which may seem conclusive in relation to the other answers 
and attitudes. But I am celebrating, and celebrating Lienhardt’s work in particular, 
for however it may be judged by cultivated theorizing skepticism, it delivers that 
inconclusive self- and other-knowledge that is among anthropology’s richest offer-
ings. There will be, as the readings of Forest monks attests, different interpretations 
of what that “self ” of the readers, or the “other” of the subjects, may be, and so dif-
ferent interpretations of what that “knowledge” may be. But Lienhardt has done as 
much as an ethnographer can do to lay down an illuminated path.
You may recall the slide of the tangled overgrown hedge (figure 3), which was 
my visual analog for social life. I now offer, as conclusion, this image for what may 
be made of that tangle through the skilled ironizing labors of a Lienhardt.
Figure 19: Speaks for itself
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De l’anthropologie en tant qu’ironie et comme philosophie, ou les nœuds 
dans les projets ethnographiques simples
Résumé : Dans cet essai au sujet des ‘nœuds anthropologiques’, j’expose trois idées 
intimement liées. La première: l’ethnographie peut être conçue comme une pra-
tique de la philosophie, puisque la philosophie est la poursuite d’un savoir sur 
nous-mêmes. La seconde idée est que la poursuite de l’ethnographie/philosophie 
est par nature ironique, ce qui en d’autres termes signifie qu’elle est tissée, ou nouée, 
à la croisée de différents points de vue, à la manière de l’œuvre philosophique de 
Socrate, qui fut construite en ironisant sur des conversations entre les points de 
vue divergents de différentes personnes. La troisième idée présentée est que cette 
prouesse doit être célébrée ; et nous suggérons à nouveau que cette prouesse résulte 
d’un nœud, d’un assemblage. 
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